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Abstract: Multimedia internet keying protocol (MIKEY) aims at establishing
secure credentials between two communicating entities. However, existing
MIKEY modes fail to meet the requirements of low-power and
low-processing devices. To address this issue, we combine two previously
proposed approaches to introduce a new compressed and distributed MIKEY
mode applied to a collaborative internet of things context. A set of third
parties is used to discharge the constrained nodes from heavy computational
operations. Doing so, the MIKEY pre-shared mode is used in the constrained
part of network, while the public key mode is used in the unconstrained part
of the network. Furthermore, to mitigate the communication cost we introduce
a new header compression scheme that reduces the size of MIKEY’s header
from 12 bytes to 3 bytes in the best compression case. To assess our
approach, we performed a detailed security analysis using a formal validation
tool (i.e., Avispa). In addition, we performed an energy evaluation of both
communicational and computational costs. The obtained results show that
our proposed mode is energy preserving whereas its security properties are
preserved untouched.
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1 Introduction
Internet of things (IoT) is based on the pervasive presence of various wireless
technologies such as radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags, sensors, actuators
and mobile phones, in which computing and communication systems are seamlessly
embedded (Lin et al., 2017). It is considered as one of the most important
communication development in recent years. It makes our everyday objects (e.g., health
sensors, industrial equipments, vehicles, clothes, etc.) connected to each other and to
the internet (Abdmeziem et al., 2016a). Besides, collaborative peer-to-peer groups are
increasingly popular, both in our personal and professional spheres. In fact, joining
efforts to achieve common goals allows taking advantage of cumulated knowledge and
experiences. Therefore, the cost to achieve these goals is considerably reduced, while
the resulting quality is improved (Gnimpieba et al., 2015; Benouaret et al., 2013). In
the context of ubiquitous IoT, collaborative applications are enhanced with contextual
data gathered from the environment. This sensing is usually operated using tiny devices
with highly constrained resources.
Establishing shared security credentials to secure communications between the
constrained devices and the collaborative peers is challenging (Khan and Salah, 2017;
Kouicem et al., 2018). In fact, it is daunting to consider existing key management
schemes without introducing adapted mechanisms to take into account IoT specificities
(Sicari et al., 2016). The scarcity of both power and computational resources will
clearly hinder traditional solutions deployment (Jing et al., 2014; Tolone et al., 2005).
In addition, considering the constrained nodes as part of the collaborative group induces
significant security issues. Indeed, sensing devices are generally replaced after relatively
short periods of time. Thus, authenticating each new device will generate a considerable
overhead and will open security breaches. Moreover, the recurring rekeying operations
to update the group key within the collaborative group will rapidly drain the device’s
battery energy level.
More importantly, engaging a highly constrained device with non-constrained
entities in asymmetric cryptographic exchanges will inevitably lead to gaps in end
to end security (Cheng et al., 2019). To address these issues, we extend two
previous approaches (Abdmeziem et al., 2016b, 2018) to propose a new standard-based
compressed and distributed key management scheme. Doing so, we design a new hybrid
mode for MIKEY protocol that mitigates both computational and communication costs.
Indeed, we do not consider the constrained node as part of the collaborative group, but
rather, as a subcontractor acting on its behalf.
Firstly, we propose a new IPv6 over low power wireless personal area networks
(6LoWPAN) header compression scheme to reduce the communication cost. Our scheme
is intended to save energy and to avoid 6LoWPAN fragmentation that may occur when
a datagram size exceeds the link layer MTU (Maximum Transmission Unit of the IEEE
802.15.4 protocol). Indeed, fragmentation is undesirable, as 6LoWPAN is vulnerable
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to fragmentation attacks (Hummen et al., 2013b). Secondly, we propose a cooperative
approach to discharge constrained nodes from heavy computational operations. To do
so, we divide our network model into two segments. The first segment covers the
communication channel between the constrained nodes and a set of third parties, to
which the heavy computational operations are offloaded. To lighten the computational
cost on constrained entities, only symmetric operations are used (i.e., pre-shared key
mode). The second segment covers the communication channel between the third parties
and any remote entity to which gathered data is transmitted. In this segment, asymmetric
operations are used (i.e., public key mode).
The proposed distributed mode allows mitigating the disadvantages of both
pre-shared key mode and the public key mode while benefiting from their advantages.
To evaluate our proposed hybrid MIKEY mode, we first conducted a theoretical analysis
of its security properties that were later formally validated through an implementation
using Avispa tool (http://www.avispa-project.org). Second, we assessed the variation of
the energy consumption of constrained entities using various numbers of third parties as
well as numerous rates of compression. The obtained results showed that our approach
does not alter the security soundness of MIKEY protocol, and all security features in
terms of data confidentiality, data authentication, and data integrity are preserved. In
addition, performances evaluation showed a remarkable gain in energy costs regarding
both communication and computation overheads resulting from the introduction of
distribution and compression.
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the required
background for a clear comprehension of the proposed approach. In Section 3, we
introduce our compressed and distributed MIKEY mode. First, we present our network
architecture and assumptions. Then, we detail the proposed approach. In Section 4, the
security properties are analysed. Our performance analysis is presented in Section 5.
Existing security solutions in the literature are surveyed in Section 6. Section 7
concludes the paper and sets our future research directions.
2 Background
In this section, we provide an overview of the features of MIKEY protocol (Arkko
et al., 2004), while focusing on the adaptability of its different modes to constrained
environments. In addition, we briefly present the concepts used throughout the remaining
of the paper.
2.1 MIKEY overview
MIKEY is a key management protocol that aims to provide security associations to
be used as an input for security protocols. The main motivation behind its design is
to ensure end-to-end security while remaining simple and efficient (low-latency, low
bandwidth consumption, low computational workload, small code size, and minimum
number of roundtrips) (Arkko et al., 2004). The flexibility of MIKEY allows the
designers to leverage upon several modes according to the specificities of the network
scenario. Therefore, MIKEY seems to be the adequate protocol that can be extended
to ensure secure communications in the collaborative IoT context. However, MIKEY
various modes have not originally been designed to be implemented in constrained
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environments with power and computation limitations, weak reliability of wireless links,
and high scalability requirements.
Table 1 Terminology table
Notation Description
I Initiator
R Responder
datak Data encrypted with key k
PSK Pre-shared key
MAC Message authentication code
PKx Public key of x
CERTx Certificate of x
TEK Traffic encryption key
TGK TEK generation key
RAND Fresh value used for key generation
auth key Authentication key
encr key Encryption key
HDR MIKEY header
T Timestamp
IDx Identity of x
SP Security policies
KEMAC fTGKgencr key/envelopekeyjjMAC
PKE fenvelopekeygPK R
Signx Signature of x
MIKEY considers two entities that aim to establish a shared secret. One of the two
entities assumes the initiator role, whereas the second one assumes the responder role.
The key distribution modes are defined as follows (the different notations are described
in Table 1):
 Pre-shared key mode: in this mode, both the initiator and the responder share a
PSK from which two keys are derived, encr key and auth key. An
initialisation phase where the key is distributed is assumed. To establish a session,
the initiator randomly generates a TGK, and sends it to the responder as part of
the first message (i.e., I MESSAGE). This latter is replay protected with
timestamps, encrypted with encr key and authenticated through a MAC using
auth key. An optional verification response (i.e., R MESSAGE) from the
responder provides mutual authentication. R MESSAGE contains a MAC
computed upon both initiator and responder identities, and the same timestamp
contained in I MESSAGE using auth key (Figure 1).
In the pre-shared key mode, only symmetric operations are involved. This mode
fits well, then, with the IoT constrained environment, as it can be run with limited
energy and power resources. Nevertheless, this mode suffers from a severe
scalability issue due to the pre-establishment phase during which a shared key is
set between the involved parties.
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 Public key mode: in this mode, the initiator transmits the generated TGK based
on an ‘envelope key’ approach. The initiator encrypts and authenticates the TGK
using a randomly/pseudo-randomly chosen envelope key, and sends it as part of
I MESSAGE. In addition, it includes the envelope key encrypted with the
responder public key PKR. In case where the responder owns several public
keys, the initiator specifies the used key in the facultative CHASH parameter.
Both IDI and CERTI are also optional. It is worth mentioning that
I MESSAGE is signed using PKI , and replay protected with timestamps. Similar
to the Pre-shared key mode, an optional response message (R MESSAGE)
ensures mutual authentication (Figure 2).
The public key mode is based on asymmetric primitives. These primitives use
complex exponential operations, which prove to be difficult to run on constrained
devices. On the other side, this mode does not require from the involved entities
to pre-share credentials. Thus, two entities with no previous shared knowledge
can establish a secure communication channel.
Figure 1 Pre-shared key mode signalling flow (see online version for colours)
Figure 2 Public key mode signalling flow (see online version for colours)
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In addition to the two previous modes, a third mode called ‘Diffie-Hellman mode’ is
defined. This mode is mainly based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. This
mode has a higher computational and communication overhead compared to public key
and pre-shared modes. Due to its inadequacy with our constrained scenario, this mode
is ruled out.
2.2 Common header format (HDR)
The common header payload contains information about the different exchanged
messages. It is included as the first payload within each message. In the following, we
present a succinct description of each field contained in the MIKEY header. We refer
to RFC 3830 (Arkko et al., 2004) for a more detailed description:
 Version (8 bits): version of MIKEY.
 Data type (8 bits): type of the exchanged message.
 Next payload (8 bits): identifies the payload added after the current payload.
 V (1 bit): flag to indicate the use of a verification message.
 PRF func (7 bits): indicates the key derivation function.
 CSB ID (32 bits): crypto session bundle (CSB) is a collection of one or more
crypto sessions (CS). CSB ID field identifies the CSB.
 ] CS (8 bits): a crypto session refers to a data steam protected by a single
instance of a security protocol. ] CS field indicates the number of crypto sessions
within the CBS.
 CS ID map type (8 bits): specifies the method of uniquely mapping crypto
sessions to the security protocol sessions.
 CS ID map info (variable length) identifies and maps crypto sessions to the
security protocol sessions.
2.3 6LoWPAN adaptation layer
The 6LoWPAN standard defined in Hui and Thubert (2011) aims to transfer
IPv6 packets through IEEE 802.15.4-based networks. 6LoWPAN uses IPV6 header
compression mechanisms of IPv6 datagrams. Compression mechanisms are motivated by
the limited space available in 802.15.4 frames to encapsulate IPv6 packets. In fact, the
size of the 802.15.4 frame payload (102 bytes) leaves limited space for an IPv6 packet
as 48 bytes are required merely for its header. 6LoWPAN defines encoding formats for
compression based on shared state within contexts. In other words, it takes advantage of
the fields that are implicitly known to all nodes in the network or can be deduced from
the MAC layer. The compression scheme consists of IP header compression (IPHC) and
next header compression (NHC).
IPHC encoding describes how an IPv6 header is compressed. 13 bits of the 2 bytes
long IPHC are used for compression. The IPv6 header fields that are not compressed
are placed immediately after IPHC. Moreover, NH field in IPHC indicates whether the
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following header is encoded using NHC. If so, NHC encoding follows immediately the
compressed IPv6 header. Compression formats for different next headers are identified
by a variable ID bits plus the specific header compression encoding bits. The NHC to
encode IPv6 extension headers and UDP header are already defined. For more details
on 6LoWPAN, we refer to RFC 6282 (Hui and Thubert, 2011).
3 Contributions
In this section, we introduce a new compressed and distributed mode for MIKEY
protocol. Firstly, we present our network architecture. Secondly, we define a set of
assumptions before detailing our contributions.
3.1 Network architecture and assumptions
We consider an end-to-end secure communication channel between constrained smart
objects (i.e., sensor nodes) and any remote unconstrained entity, which is part of a
collaborative group. To do so, key management protocols are required between the two
entities to secure their communications. These protocols have to deal with resources
capabilities of the involved entities, along with the fact that no prior knowledge is
established between them.
Figure 3 Compressed and distributed MIKEY mode: network architecture (see online version
for colours)
IP-enabled smart objects are in charge of sensing data from the environment (e.g.,
temperature, pressure, stakeout, physiological data, industrial parameters, etc.). They
are generally set in a remote location from the collaborative group. Gathered data is
then transmitted from the smart object to a member of the collaborative group that
is in charge of processing, analysing, and sharing data with other members of the
collaborative group. In our architecture, we consider four main elements: the mobile and
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contextual sensors, the third parties, the remote collaborative entity and the certification
authority (Figure 3).
 Mobile and contextual sensors: the sensors are planted in the vicinity of the
environment from which data is needed. This data is used during the collaborative
process of the group.
 Third party: compared to the basic MIKEY modes, the third parties represent an
additional component. A third party could be any entity that is able to perform
high consuming computations.
 Remote collaborative entity: this entity receives the gathered data. Upon
appropriate processing, the information is shared among the collaborative group.
 Certification authority: the certification authority is required to establish trust
between the third parties and the remote entity by delivering valid and
authenticated certificates.
The network is thus heterogeneous combining entities with various capabilities both
in terms of computing power and energy resources. Smart objects (i.e., constrained
sensors) have limited computational power, memory and energy resources. They are
unable to perform public key cryptographic operations. However, the third parties and
the remote collaborative entity are equipped with high energy, computing power and
storage capabilities. They can take the form of server hardware or being distributed in
a cloud infrastructure with flexible resources. The mapping with MIKEY concepts is
defined as follows. The initiator role is mapped with the remote entity, which is part of
a large collaborative group, while the responder is mapped with the smart object (also
designated as constrained node).
Before presenting the details of our approach, we set the following assumptions:
 Constrained entities are able to perform symmetric encryption. Both third parties
and the remote collaborative entity are able to perform asymmetric cryptographic
operations.
 The third parties are not necessarily trusted.
 The certification authority is a trusted entity. It delivers authenticated
cryptographic credentials.
 Each constrained node is able to keep a list of remote third parties. This list is
pre-established during the initialisation phase.
 Each constrained node shares a PSK with each third party.
 Following its local requirements, the collaborative group selects a member, which
will delegate data gathering tasks to an IP-enabled remote IoT object.
3.2 Reducing MIKEY communication overhead (compression)
In this section, we describe our proposed 6LoWPAN header compression scheme for
MIKEY. Our compression is based on the idea that the fields, which are implicitly
known to all entities in the network or those that can be deduced from the MAC layer
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can be omitted. As presented in Section 2.3, the NHC is used to encode the IPv6
extension headers and UDP header. Nevertheless, despite 6LoWPAN has defined header
compression for UDP, no NHC compression is defined in case where headers contained
in UDP payloads are compressed. In fact, MIKEY common header is contained in the
UDP payload. Therefore, we propose to use the 6LoWPAN extension proposed in Raza
et al. (2012a) to extend 6LoWPAN header compression mechanisms. These extensions
indicate that the headers of protocols that are part of the UDP payload are compressed
with 6LoWPAN-NHC.
Table 2 Gained space through the proposed MIKEY common header compression
Field (sizes in bits) MIKEY common header Our 6LoWPAN-NHC-HDR
Version (V) 8 1
Data type (DT) 8 2
Next payload 8 8
Verification V (VF) 1 1
PRF func (PRF) 7 1
CSB ID (CSB) 32 1
] CS 8 1
CS ID map type (MT) 8 1
CS ID map info (MI) Variable length 1
Figure 4 Our 6LoWPAN-NHC-HDR encoding compared to the basic MIKEY header
MIKEY common header is 12 bytes long. It is appended to each packet through the
different exchanged messages. We propose a 6LoWPAN-NHC to compress MIKEY
header called 6LoWPAN-NHC-HDR. The proposed approach allows to reduce the
header length from 12 bytes to 3 bytes (2 bytes for our 6LoWPAN-NHC-HDR plus
1 byte for the next payload field that is always carried inline) in the best compression
case. In fact, only 13 bits are required to encode the different fields. Nevertheless, in
order to remain standard compliant (i.e., the size of NHC encodings is multiple of bytes),
our 6LoWPAN-NHC-HDR is 2 bytes long. In addition, to comply with 6LoWPAN-NHC
encoding schemes, the first four bits implement an ID field to uniquely identify our
NHC encoding. We set the ID bits to 1100. To the best of our knowledge, the 1100 bits
are currently unused as NHC identifiers. In the following, we present in detail the
encoding approach for each field (see Table 2 and Figure 4):
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 Version (V): if 0, the version is the default and latest MIKEY version defined in
Arkko et al. (2004) and the field is skipped. If future versions are defined, the bit
is set to 1 and the version number is carried inline after the
6LoWPAN-NHC-HDR header. Our compression is thus kept dynamic and flexible.
 Data type (DT): the data type field describes the type of the exchanged messages.
Based on our proposed distributed mode (see Section 3.3), we only consider three
types of messages (plus the ERROR type), which are involved with the
constrained nodes. Doing so, we are then able to use just 2 bits encoding for the
data type field instead of 8 bits in the original MIKEY modes:
00 : I TPi MESSAGE
01 : TPi I MESSAGE
10 : R I MESSAGE
11 : ERROR
 Verification V (VF): the VF field encoding is similar to the non-compressed
header. If it is set to 0, no verification message is used. When it is set to 1, a
verification message is required.
 PRF func (PRF): if 0, the default PRF function defined in Arkko et al. (2004) is
used. If set to 1, the PRF function value is carried inline.
 CSB ID (CSB): the CSB ID is chosen by the initiator and needs to be unique
between each initiator-responder pair. Instead of carrying its 32 bits size inline,
we propose to derivate the CSB ID from the concatenation of lower layer
identifiers (e.g., IPv6 addresses). One bit is sufficient for the encoding. If set to 0,
the CSB ID is derived instead of being carried inline. If set to 1, the 32 bits CSB
ID are carried after the 6LoWPAN-NHC-HDR header.
 ] CS: if we assume in our constrained scenario that there is only one CS in each
CSB, there is no need therefore for keeping 8 bits to indicate the number of
crypto sessions. We are then able to encode the ] CS with 1 bit. If this bit is set
to 0, only one CS is considered. In addition, to make our compression flexible, if
the bit is set to 1, the number of CS is carried inline.
 CS ID map type(MT): if 0, the default GENERIC-ID map type defined in Arkko
et al. (2004) is used. If set to 1, the CS ID map type is carried inline.
 CS ID map info (MI): the CS ID map info size is kept variable in Arkko et al.
(2004). If we assume that there is only one CS in each CSB, we could use 1 bit
for the encoding. If 0, the unique CS is identified with its corresponding mapping
to the security protocol for which security associations are created. If set to 1, the
map info field is carried inline.
The next payload field is always carried inline as it is impossible to predict or deduce the
next payload content. In addition, the three last bits are used as padding bits to remain
standard compliant with RFC 6282 (Montenegro et al., 2007) (NHC size is defined as
2 bytes long).
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3.3 Reducing MIKEY computation overhead (distribution)
We divide our network architecture into two segments. The first segment is defined
by the communication channel linking the constrained node to the third parties. This
segment involves the constrained entities of our network model. As a result, we consider
using the pre-shared key mode. The second segment is defined by the communication
channel linking the third parties to the collaborative entity. This segment does not suffer
from resources constraints. As a result, we consider using the public key mode.
Figure 5 Illustration of the different message exchanges of our proposed mode (see online
version for colours)
After an initialisation phase where the constrained node is pre-loaded with a set of third
parties identities, along with the different PSK, our distributed mode proceeds with
successive messages. Table 1 summarises the notations used, and Figure 5 illustrates
the signalling flow. To remain standard compliant, the messages header, along with
various message parameters are kept unchanged [RFC 3830 (Arkko et al., 2004)]. In
the following, we detail the different exchanged messages:
 I TPi MESSAGE: the initiator randomly generates a secret TGK, which will be
used later to further derive keying materials at both I and R sides. The TGK is
split into n parts TGK1, TGK2, ...TGKn. I randomly generates an envelope key.
This key is used to encrypt and authenticate the generated TGKi parts, which are
included in I TPi MESSAGE. The envelope key is encrypted with the public key
of each TPi and included in the message. In addition, I’s signature that covers all
the fields of the message is also included. Each part is then sent to the appropriate
TPi in I TPi MESSAGE. The general structure of the message is as follows:
8i 2 f1; Ng fHDR;T;RAND; [IDI ]; [CERTI ];
[IDR]; SP;KEMACi; [CHASH]gPKTPi ; PKE; SIGNI
Because wireless connection is the main media in IoT, I applies an error
redundancy scheme to the generated TGK. Doing so, R can retrieve the secret
without requiring the reception of all the packets, if some of them were lost
during the transmission process. For instance, the widely used Reed-Solomon
scheme can be applied (Reed and Solomon, 1960).
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 TPi I MESSAGE: upon receiving I TPi MESSAGE, each TPi authenticates and
decrypts the received message. An optional verification response sent from TPi to
I provides mutual authentication. The structure of the message is as follows.
8i 2 f1; Ng fHDR;T; [IDR]gPKI
 TPi R MESSAGE: after having properly authenticated and decrypted the received
I TPi MESSAGE, TPi includes TGKi in TPi R MESSAGE. This message is
replay protected with timestamps, encrypted and authenticated using the
pre shared PSK. The structure of the message is as follows:
8i 2 f1; Ng fHDR;T;RAND; [IDI ]; [IDR];
SPgPSKi ;KEMACi
 R TPi MESSAGE: upon successful authentication and decryption of
TPi R MESSAGE by R, the TGK is retrieved. In fact, after having received
enough packets containing the different TGKi, R reconstructs the original TGK.
An optional verification response sent from R to TPi provides mutual
authentication. The structure of the message is as follows:
8i 2 f1; Ng fHDR;T; [IDR]gPSKi
 R I MESSAGE: using the established TGK, R encrypts and authenticates a
verification message (i.e., R I MESSAGE). This latter is sent to I , which
authenticates the received message. A successful authentication is considered as a
proof of R’s knowledge of TGK. It is worth noting that R I MESSAGE is
optional and only sent if IDI has been included in the different exchanges. The
structure of the message is as follows:
fHDR;T; [IDR]gTEK
The reconstructed TGK is used to derive further keying materials. The derivation
process is detailed in MIKEY RFC 3830 (Arkko et al., 2004). Both I and R
are then able to derive state connection keys for encryption and authentication of
the exchanged data. A secure end-to-end channel is hence created between highly
constrained devices (i.e., sensors) and remote unconstrained entities. Our distributed
MIKEY mode takes advantage of both pre-shared and public-key modes, while
mitigating their disadvantages.
4 Security analysis
4.1 Key exchange properties
In this section, we briefly analyse the security features of our proposed mode based
on the properties presented in Roman et al. (2011). For the following discussion, we
consider our communication channel split into two segments: Seg1 from R to the TPi
and Seg2 from the TPi to I (see Figures 3 and 5):
 Confidentiality: regarding Seg1, the exchanged messages between R and the
different TPi are encrypted using the corresponding PSKi. Based on RFC 3830
(Arkko et al., 2004), we advocate the use of AES-CCM mode that defines
Securing IoT-based collaborative applications 13
AES-CBC for MAC generation and AES-CTR for encryption (Dworkin, 2007).
Nowadays, more and more tiny sensors include AES hardware co-processor,
which would help to decrease the overhead. Regarding Seg2, communications are
secured using Public Key Encryption. The certification authority is in charge of
delivering the required certificates.
 Authentication and integrity: in our protocol, communications are authenticated
using MACs in Seg1 and digital signatures in Seg2. The exchanged data is, then,
guaranteed to remain genuine. This property ensures that data has not been
altered, and has been sent from legitimate entities (and to legitimate entities, as
verification messages can be added to provide mutual authentication).
Furthermore, nonces (i.e., time-stamps) are included in the exchanged messages
for protection against replay attacks.
 Distribution: similar to the Pre-shared mode, an initialisation phase is required to
distribute the shared PSK between the constrained nodes and the TPi. This
phase is generally performed off-line. Nevertheless, in Seg2 and similar to the
Public key mode, TPi and I establish a secure channel in an online mode taking
advantage from the asymmetric primitives. As a consequence, upon an initial
distribution in Seg1, our proposed mode can be run without any external
intervention allowing automatic updates.
 Overhead: the constrained entities are only involved in symmetric operations,
which are much less resource consuming than asymmetric ones (Wander et al.,
2005). Actually, the powerful third parties take in charge all asymmetric
operations. Indeed, limiting computation solicitations for the constrained nodes
decreases their power consumption and thus increases their battery life-time.
 Resilience: involving several third parties in the key exchange process makes our
protocol highly resilient. To compromise and recover the exchanged secret TGK,
an attacker would need to corrupt all third parties, as TGK is split into numerous
shares. Thus, unless an attacker compromises all TPi, it is nearly impossible to
recover the original TGK. As a result, our mode does not assume all third parties
to be trusted.
 Extensibility and scalability: in a collaborative IoT scenario, contextual sensors
can be needed at any time to gather specific data. Our protocol requires an
initialisation phase where the sensor (i.e., R) is set with a list of TPi identities
along with the PSKi that are shared with each TPi. However, our protocol
proceeds without any operation regarding the TPi or I . After the initialisation
phase, the joining node is ready to establish an end-to-end secure channel with
any remote entity.
 Storage: due to recent hardware advances in flash memory (Tsiftes and Dunkels,
2011), smart objects provide considerable amounts of storage space. This space is
used to store the TPi’s identities list, along with the corresponding PSKi.
Furthermore, we assume that the number of TPi will not exceed a reasonable
threshold. Consequently, storage space is not considered as an issue in our
protocol deployment.
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4.2 Formal validation
To prove that our protocol does not violate the required security properties, in particular,
confidentiality, authentication, delivery proof and replay protection, we carried out
an analysis using Avispa tool (http://www.avispa-project.org). Automated Validation of
Internet Security Protocol and Applications (AVISPA) is a state-of-the-art verification
tool for security protocols that includes a set of model checkers with a common front
end. The tool follows the Dolev-Yao intruder model (Dolev and Yao, 1981) to intercept
messages, or to insert modified data. It performs analytical rules to state whether the
protocol is safe or not. In case of unsafety, the tool provides a trace highlighting the
steps that led to the attack.
Figure 6 Avispa output (OFMC) (see online version for colours)
Figure 7 Avispa output (CL AtSe) (see online version for colours)
Protocol models in Avispa are written in a role-based language called High Level
Protocol Specification Language, or HLPSL (Chevalier et al., 2004). The actions of the
different entities are specified in a module called basic role, while their interactions are
defined by composing multiple basic roles together into a composed role. In addition,
the security goals of the analysed protocol are specified in the goal section before
launching the analysis. Besides, Avispa uses several different automatic protocol analysis
Securing IoT-based collaborative applications 15
techniques to validate the analysed protocol against the specified security goals, such
as the on-the-fly model-checker (OFMC), and the constraint-logic-based attack searcher
(CL-AtSe).
Figure 8 Avispa output (TA4SP ) (see online version for colours)
In our modeling, we first specified a basic role to describe the actions of the
different entities involved. Then, we specified how the participants interact with
each other in a composed role. The different roles were specified using the HLPSL
language, and introduced as an input for Avispa tool. The specification has been
analysed against the Dolev-Yao intruder model using the OFMC, the TA4SP, and the
CL-AtSe backends. The results were indicated in reports for each backend model
produced by Avispa tool. They show that our new exchange mode is ‘SAFE’ against
OFMC (Figure 6), and CL AtSe (Figure 7). However, against TA4SP database,
the result was ‘INCONCLUSIVE’ (Figure 8). According to Avispa user manual
(http://www.avispa-project.org), an inconclusive result does not imply that an attack has
been detected. Based on the obtained results, we can affirm that our proposed hybrid
mode is safe with respect to the specified security goals.
5 Performances analysis
In this section, we provide a performance evaluation of our contribution focusing on
energy consumption. Indeed, battery-powered IoT devices are highly sensitive to energy
limitations. We proceed by presenting the energy model upon which our evaluation is
based, then we discuss and analyse the obtained results.
5.1 Energy model
To assess the energy consumption of our tailoring approach of MIKEY protocol, we
defined an energy model. This model is based on the measurements presented in
De Meulenaer et al. (2008) and Kaps and Sunar (2006). In De Meulenaer et al. (2008),
authors measured the energy consumption triggered by communication operations,
whereas in Kaps and Sunar (2006), authors measured the energy consumption triggered
by computation operations. These measurements took place on constrained entities
providing only few MHz of computational power, and few kilobytes of RAM and ROM.
In our evaluation, we consider the total energy cost as the sum of both computational
and communicational costs. In fact, the communicational cost is the result of sending
and receiving operations, while the computational cost the result of authentication and
encryption operations. The energy model is presented in Table 3.
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Table 3 Energy model
Operation Cost
Send 1 bit 0:72 J
Receive 1 bit 0:81 J
AES-128 128-bits encryption 28:11 J
SHA-1 128-bits MAC computation 23:9 J
Public key encryption (ECC-160) 17 mJ
Public key signature (ECDSA-160) 15 mJ
Besides, we set the following assumptions regarding our evaluation:
 We only focus on the energy constrained parts of our network architecture,
namely, the mobile and contextual sensors.
 We only consider the header in the exchanged messages. The header is the part
that is subject to our compression scheme. The remaining components of the
messages are constant in term of size for both basic and tailored MIKEY protocol.
 The length of the ‘CS ID map info’ field is dynamic and is not set in MIKEY
specification. Indeed, to perform our estimation, we set the size to 2 bytes.
5.2 Results
To assess the energy gains obtained through our approach, we first evaluated the
energy cost of a MIKEY key exchange session when no third party is used. In other
words, using asymmetric primitives. Then, we evaluated the energy cost while varying
the number of third parties from two third parties to ten. In addition, we considered
numerous header compression rates when evaluating the energy consumption ranging
from 0% (no compression) to 100 % (maximum compression). Table 4 indicates the
different used compression rates. Each rate determines the set of fields to be compressed
using our proposed 6LoWPAN-NHC-HDR.
Table 4 Space gained vs compression rate
Compression rate (%) Compressed fields Gained space (bits)
0 None of the fields are compressed 0
16.4 V, DT 13
32.9 V, DT, PRF, MT 26
51.9 V, DT, PRF,] CS, MI 41
72.1 V, DT, PRF, MT, CSB 57
83.5 V, DT,] CS, MI, CSB 66
100 All the fields are compressed 72
The results of our performances analysis are introduced in Table 5. In Figure 91, we
depict the evolution of the energy consumption while increasing both the compression
rate and the number of third parties. It is clear that energy consumption drops sharply
with the introduction of two third parties. This is due to the fact that using third
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parties spares the constrained nodes from running asymmetric primitives, which are
much resource consuming than symmetric primitives. Furthermore, we note that the
energy consumption increases with the inclusion of additional third parties, albeit the
energy consumption remains far inferior to the case where no third party is used. The
increase in energy consumption with the introduction of third parties is the result of an
increased number of exchanged messages, which raises the overall energy consumption
overhead. Furthermore, the results show a decrease in energy consumption each time
the compression level is raised. This is due to the fact that both communicational and
computational costs are reduced when the size of data to send, receive, encrypt, or
authenticate is reduced (i.e., compressed).
Table 5 Energy cost evaluation
Compression (%) # Third parties Communication (uJ) Computation (uJ) Total cost (uJ)
0 0 146.88 38,400 38,546.88
2 362.88 159.16 522.04
6 950.4 399.48 1,349.88
10 1,537.92 639.8 2,177.72
51.9 0 84.15 21,990 22,074.15
2 207.9 91.13 299.03
6 544.5 228.7 773.2
10 881.1 366.33 1,247.43
100 0 36.72 9,600 9,636.72
2 90.72 26.77 117.49
6 237.6 99.87 337.47
10 384.48 159.95 544.43
Figure 9 Compressed and distributed MIKEY mode: energy consumption evolution
(see online version for colours)
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Relying on the performance evaluation results, we can conclude that our proposed
hybrid MIKEY mode provides a noticeable gain in energy consumption that is highly
sought by battery-powered constrained IoT-based entities. As a matter of fact, both
compression and distribution contribute in reducing MIKEY overhead. The more
compression rate is increased, the more energy gain is obtained. It is worthy of
note that the number of header fields which can be compressed depends on the
application for which MIKEY protocol is implemented. Besides, including additional
third parties strengthens security, as more of them need to be corrupted in order to
retrieve the exchanged secret materials. However, this result in less energy gains due
to the communication overhead. Hence, a trade-off is required between security and
performances.
6 Literature review: discussion
In our literature review, we distinguish two main research axes. The first axis is focused
on compression schemes applied on standard-based protocols, while the second axis
is focused on approaches based on the offloading of heavy computational operations
to third parties. Numerous energy aware approaches have been introduced for the
IP-based IoT (e.g., Abdelfadeel et al., 2017; Raza et al., 2012b; Hummen et al., 2013a).
In Montenegro et al. (2007) and Hui and Thubert (2011), the compression of IPV6
headers, extension headers along with UDP headers has been standardised through
6LoWPAN. Raza et al. (2011) presented 6LoWPAN compressions for IPsec payload
headers (AH and ESP). In Raza et al. (2012b), an IKE compression scheme has also
been proposed providing a lightweight automatic way to establish security associations
for IPsec. Likewise, header compression layers for DTLS, HIP DEX, and HIP BEX were
respectively introduced in Raza et al. (2012a), Hummen et al. (2013a) and Sahraoui and
Bilami (2015). Furthermore, Abdmeziem et al. (2018) introduced a compression scheme
in addition to a new exchange mode to reduce MIKEY TICKET overhead.
Besides the proposed standard-based schemes, several approaches that aim to offload
resource consuming operations to third entities have been proposed. Abdmeziem and
Charoy (2018) highlighted the relevance of including controllers to support resource
consuming primitives, while establishing group keys for collaborative systems. In
addition, Saied and Olivereau (2012) introduced a collaborative approach for HIP.
The idea is to take advantage of more powerful nodes in the neighborhood of a
constrained node to carry heavy computations in a distributed way. Likewise, IKE
session establishment delegation to the gateway has been proposed in Bonetto et al.
(2012). Furthermore, Freeman et al. (2007) introduce a delegation procedure that enables
a client to delegate certificate validation to a trusted server. While the precedent
delegation approaches reduce the computational load at the constrained node, they break
the end to end principle by requiring a third trusted party. Abdmeziem and Tandjaoui
(2015) addressed the precedent issue by enhancing the existing schemes to ensure the
end to end property.
Our approach combines the solutions from both research axes. In fact, it is based
on the offloading of heavy asymmetric operations to third parties, and on a new
compression scheme for MIKEY header. To the best of our knowledge, no prior similar
work has been proposed for MIKEY applied to collaborative applications in the context
of internet of things.
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7 Conclusions and perspectives
We addressed the issue of setting secure communication channels between constrained
entities and more powerful entities within a collaborative IoT context. We proposed a
combined compressed and distributed MIKEY mode to mitigate both computational and
communication costs. To reduce the size of the exchanged messages, we introduced
a new header compression scheme that allows lightening the size of the header
from 12 bytes to 3 bytes in the best compression case. In addition, to mitigate the
computational overhead, heavy operations are offloaded to a set of dedicated third
parties. Doing so, the constrained entities are only involved in the symmetric operations
of the pre-shared mode. The public key mode is left to the unconstrained part of the
network. As a result, the constrained entities are able to establish a secured channel with
any remote entity without having established an initial shared knowledge. Our security
evaluation involved a formal analysis of MIKEY security properties using Avispa tool.
The results showed that our tailoring did not alter the security strength of MIKEY
protocol. Moreover, our performance evaluation using energy models allowed us to
highlight the obtained energy gains which increased with the increase of the compression
rate of MIKEY header. Besides, the inclusion of additional third parties leads to a
progressive inflation of energy consumption, hence a trade-off should be set between
security strength and performances. As a future work, we plan an implementation on real
test-beds to assess energy consumption performances under real conditions. In addition,
we intend to investigate lightweight group key management protocols for collaborative
IoT applications.
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Notes
1 In Figure 9, notice that for a better clarity of results presentation, we divided the energy
consumption of asymmetric primitives by a factor of 10.
